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For many students throughout the world the time to obtain an academic degree extends
beyond the normal completion time while college tuition is typically constant during the
years of enrollment. In particular, it does not increase when a student remains in a program
beyond the normal completion time. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design on data from
Bocconi University in Italy, this paper shows that a tuition increase of 1,000 euro in the last
year of studies would reduce the probability of late graduation by 6.1 percentage points with
respect to a benchmark average probability of 80%. We conclude suggesting that an upward
sloping tuition proﬁle is eﬃcient in situations in which eﬀort is suboptimally supplied, for
instance in the presence of public subsidies to education, congestion externalities and/or
peer eﬀects.
JEL Classiﬁcation: I2, C31
Keywords: tuition, student performance, regression discontinuity1 Introduction
For many students enrolled in academic programs throughout the world time
to obtain a degree extends beyond the normal completion time. Interestingly,
this happens while college tuition is typically kept constant during the years
of enrollment and in particular does not increase (actually it often decreases)
when a student remains in a program after its regular end. This paper shows
that these two facts–the time proﬁle of tuition and the speed of graduation–
are related and suggests that if tuition were raised towards the end of a
program, keeping constant the total cost of education, the probability of late
graduation would be reduced. It also suggests that an upward sloping tuition
proﬁle can increase eﬃciency in the presence of public subsidies to education,
congestion externalities and/or peer eﬀects.
We discuss the link between the time proﬁle of tuition and time to grad-
uation in a simple model of human capital accumulation in which obtaining
a degree is an uncertain outcome and requires time. Whereas the tuition a
student pays initially in a program is a sunk cost, and thus has no eﬀect on
incentives, students anticipate the tuition they will pay later on and react
accordingly. As a result, an upward sloping tuition proﬁle raises students’
eﬀort initially and increases the overall speed of completion. The core of the
paper takes this simple prediction to the data and estimates the causal eﬀect
of a higher tuition in the last regular year of a program on the probability to
obtain a degree beyond the normal completion time.
We base our empirical analysis on detailed administrative data from Boc-
coni University in Milan, a private institution that, during the period for
which we have information (1992-2000), oﬀered a 4-years college degree in
economics. This dataset is informative on the question under study not only
because more than 80% of Bocconi graduates typically complete their degree
in more than 4 years, but also because it oﬀers a unique quasi-experimental
setting to analyze the eﬀect of the tuition proﬁle on the probability of com-
pleting a degree beyond the normal time.
Upon enrollment in each academic year, Bocconi students in our sample
1are assigned to one of 12 tuition levels on the basis of their income, assessed
by the university administration through the income tax declaration of the
student’s household and through further inquiries. A Regression Disconti-
nuity Design (RDD) can then be used to compare students who, in terms
of family income, are immediately above or below each discontinuity thresh-
old. These two groups of students pay diﬀerent tuitions to enroll, but should
otherwise be identical in terms of observable and unobservable characteris-
tics determining the outcome of interest, which in our case is the decision
to complete the program in time. Using this source of identiﬁcation of the
causal eﬀect of a tuition increase, we show that if the fourth year tuition
eﬀectively paid by a student is raised by 1,000 euro, the probability of late
graduation decreases by 6.1 percentage points (with respect to an observed
probability of 80%). This happens through two channels: because a higher
4-th year tuition raises eﬀort in previous years, and because – as we shall
discuss – the 4-th year tuition is a good predictor of the tuition a student
will pay if he stays in the program one more year. We also show that this
decline in the probability of late graduation is not associated with an increase
in the dropout rate or with a fall in the quality of students’ performance as
measured by the ﬁnal graduation mark.
In light of these results, we proceed to ask whether there might be eﬃ-
ciency reasons suggesting that the time proﬁle of tuition should be upward
sloping in real life academic institutions. We do not know much about the
optimal length of the learning period for given amount of notions to be
learned–this is in fact an issue that has been rarely explored in the liter-
ature. In principle a student could be left to decide the optimal speed at
which she learns, and thus the time to graduation, and there is no reason
why such a time should be the same for all students. In the absence of im-
perfections, private incentives would lead to completion times that are also
socially optimal. We argue, however, that this is not the case at least in the
presence of public subsidies to education, congestion externalities and peer
eﬀects. In the (frequent) situations in which these imperfections exist and
generate externalities, tuition should be raised at the end of a program, rela-
2tive to the marginal cost of providing education, since eﬀort would otherwise
be sub-optimally supplied.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature.
Section 3 presents the available international evidence on the time to degree
completion and on the time proﬁle of tuition. Section 4 proposes a simple
model of human capital accumulation that delivers our main empirical pre-
diction, namely, the existence of a negative causal eﬀect of the size of tuition
in later years of a program on the probability of obtaining a degree beyond
the normal completion time. Section 5 describes the data, while Section 6
shows how a Regression Discontinuity Design can be used to identify the
causal eﬀect of interest and discusses the robustness of our results with re-
spect to some important complications generated by the institutional setting
in which our evaluation takes place. Finally, Section 7 discusses eﬃciency,
suggesting that the time proﬁle of tuition should be upward sloping. Section
8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a small literature looking at the eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on the
time to complete a college degree, but its ﬁndings are ambiguous and typi-
cally not based on experimental evidence capable to control adequately for
confounding factors and in particular for students’ ability. Among the less
recent non experimental studies, Bowen and Rudenstine (1992) and Ehren-
berg and Mavros (1995) ﬁnd evidence of an eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives, in
particular on completion rates and time to degree, while Booth and Satchell
(1995) ﬁnd no such evidence.
A more recent study by Hakkinen and Uusitalo (2003) evaluates a reform
of the ﬁnancial aid system in Finland aimed at reducing incentives to delay
graduation, ﬁnding that the reform had some small eﬀect in the desired direc-
tion. Similar in spirit, but with ambiguous ﬁndings, is the paper by Heineck
et al. (2006) that evaluates the German reform of 1998 which introduced a
fee on top of the normal tuition for students enrolled in a university program
3beyond the regular completion time. Both these studies, although based on
the exogenous variation generated by a policy change, cannot fully control
for confounding factors because they identify the eﬀect of a tuition increase
on delayed enrollment only on the basis of a comparison of students before
and after the reform.
Similarly plagued by the likely presence of confounding factors is the
study by Groen et al. (2006) which evaluates the eﬀect of the Graduate
Education Initiative (GEI) ﬁnanced by the A.W. Mellon Foundation. This
program distributed a total of 80 million dollars to 51 departments in 10
universities with the explicit goal of ﬁnancing incentives aimed at reducing
students’ attrition and time to degree. By comparing these departments
with a sample of similar control institutions, the study concludes that the
GEI had a modest impact on the outcomes under study, mostly reducing
student attrition rather than increasing degree completion.1
A larger and older literature studies the eﬀect of tuition and ﬁnancial aid
on college enrollment. Van der Klaauw (2002) exploits the evidence gener-
ated by discontinuities in the rules for the concession of ﬁnancial aid in a US
college. The methodology used in our paper is inspired by that study. In
terms of substantive results, among the most recent and reliable contribu-
tions based on a quasi-experimental framework, Kane (2003) estimates that
a 1,000$ increase in college costs decreases enrollment rates by 4 percentage
points while Dynarski (2003) ﬁnds that a grant aid of 1,000$ increases the
probability of attending college by 3.6 percentage points. Albeit related to
our work, however, the question addressed by this literature is very diﬀerent.2
Closer to our research goal are instead some recent papers that study, with
mixed results, the eﬀect of merit based ﬁnancial incentives on indicators of
student’s performance. Angrist and Lavy (2002) run diﬀerent trials oﬀering
1Other papers study diﬀerent non-ﬁnancial incentives aﬀecting graduation times: for
example, demographic characteristics in Siegfried and Stock (2001); supervisor quality
in Van Ours and Ridder (2003) and labor market conditions in Brunello and Winter-
Ebmer (2003). Dearden et al. (2002) study instead the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on
educational choices of highschool graduates.
2See the surveys in Leslie and Brinkman (1987) and Dynarsky (2002).
4ﬁnancial incentives to Israeli highschool students aimed at increasing degree
completion and conclude that signiﬁcant gains can be obtained by oﬀering
cash awards in low-achieving schools. Dynarski (2005) ﬁnds substantial pos-
itive eﬀects of merit aid programs in Georgia and Arkansas on the rate of
degree completion. On the contrary, within a randomized ﬁeld experiment at
a large Canadian university, Angrist, Lang and Oreopulos (2006) ﬁnd weak
eﬀects of merit scholarship on grades and only for females. Similarly, Leuven
et al. (2006) perform a ﬁeld experiment in which ﬁrst year university stu-
dents can earn ﬁnancial rewards for passing all ﬁrst year requirements and
ﬁnd small and non-signiﬁcant average eﬀects on passing rates and collected
credit points.
Among the papers ﬁnding positive eﬀects, Kremer et al. (2005) is partic-
ularly relevant from our viewpoint. These authors conducted a randomized
experiment in Kenia that oﬀered school fees exemption and large cash awards
to girls who scored well on academic exams. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that ﬁ-
nancial incentives to student performance have positive externalities, since
boys, who were ineligible for the award, also experienced an improvement in
exam scores. The same happened for girls with low pretest scores who were
very unlikely to win. The authors conclude that these large externalities
address some of the equity concerns raised by critics of merit awards, and
provide further rationale for public education subsidies. This is particularly
relevant in our context because, as we argue in Section 7, the existence of
peer eﬀects is one of the reasons that justify an increase in continuation tu-
ition, relative to the marginal cost of providing education, with the goal of
inducing students to exert the socially optimal amount of eﬀort.
To summarize, the mixed results of this literature may be a consequenceof
the more general ambiguity of the eﬀects of monetary incentives highlighted
by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) and certainly require more research based
on (quasi-)experimental evidence, which is our goal in this paper.
53 Time to degree and time proﬁle of tuition
around the world
A simple Google search of the words “Time to degree completion” produces
an endless series of documents suggesting that throughout the world there is
a generalized concern for the fact that a large fraction of students remains
in educational programs beyond their normal completion times. Moreover,
in many cases this tendency appear to have increased in recent years.
At the Ph.D. level in the US these are well known facts that have gen-
erated widespread concern. In the representative sample collected by Hoﬀer
and Welch (2006), the median time to obtain a Ph.D was 9 years in 1978 and
increased to 10.1 years in 2003 with a similar pattern across ﬁelds. Such a
number of years is almost twice what most universities consider as the regular
completion time (i.e. 4-5 years). These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed also by OSEP
(1990), Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995), Groen et al. (2006) and Siegfried and
Stock (2001).
Perhaps less well known is the fact that a problem exists in the U.S.
also at the undergraduate level where, according to Bound at al (2006),
time to completion of a degree has increased markedly over the last two
decades. These authors compare two cohorts of students who graduated
from highschool in 1972 and in 1992 ﬁnding that the fraction receiving a
degree within 4 years dropped from 57.6% to 44.0% and the average time to
degree increased by more than one-quarter of a year. Beyond the fact that
the increase in time to degree is localized among graduates of non-selective
public colleges and universities, they conclude that changes in observable
characteristics of the two cohorts do not contribute to explain the increase
in time to degree.
A long series of documents, available on the internet, conﬁrms this gen-
eral ﬁnding. The US Department of Education (2003), reports that ﬁrst-
time recipients of bachelor’s degrees in 1999-2000 took on average “about
55 months from ﬁrst enrollment to degree completion”. This is about one
year more than the normal completion time of 45 months. The University
6of Southern California ﬁnds for its graduates of the academic years 96/97 -
00/01 that in all ﬁelds more than 12 quarters (the standard duration) are
needed on average to obtain a degree. While in the social sciences the delay
is more limited (12.2 quarters on average) in engineering and natural sciences
completion time reaches 13.5 quarters. A report of the State of Illinois Board
of Higher Education (1999) shows that only “25% of the entering freshmen of
the classes of 1987 through 1992 at the Illinois public universities graduated
within 4 years”, while 45% had not yet graduated at the 5 years mark. Simi-
larly at UCDavis (2004), out of 5153 bachelor’s degrees conferred in 2002-03,
46% obtained a degree in more than 4 years. Even at the level of 2 years
community colleges there is evidence that delayed completion is an issue, as
indicated by Gao (2002), which ﬁnds that only 45.2% of the ﬁrst-time full-
time freshmen at the Collin County Community College in Texas completed
their studies within 150% of the legal duration.
The situation is similar in Canada where a 2003 report of the Associa-
tion of Graduate Studies indicates that “ ... in many universities times to
completion were longer than desired.” Data are less easy to ﬁnd for other
countries, but the problem of the excessive time to degree completion is cer-
tainly not restricted to North America. A survey conducted by Brunello and
Winter-Ebmer (2003) on 3000 Economics and Business college students in 10
European countries, ﬁnds that the percentage of students “expecting to com-
plete their degree at least one year later than the required time ranges from
31.2% in Sweden and 30.8% in Italy to close to zero in the UK and Ireland.
While Swiss and Portuguese students are close to the Anglo-Saxon pattern
(3.5% and 4.6% respectively), French and German students lie in between
these extremes (17.1% and 10% respectively).” The web site of the Spanish
Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencia reports that out of 91238 graduates of
the three year undergraduate program, only 38581 completed their studies
in time, and 33791 needed from 4 to 5 years. For the Netherlands, Van Ours
and Ridder (2003) analyse the administrative data of three universities and
ﬁnd that “No Ph.D. student defends his or her thesis within three years,
while a few students graduate in three to four years. Most students ﬁnish in
7ﬁve to seven years after the start, and after seven years the fraction remains
almost constant, i.e. there are few graduations after seven years”. According
to Hakkinen and Uusitalo (2003) the problem of reducing time to graduation
has been on the Finnish government agenda since at least 1969, given that
Finland is second only to Italy, among OECD countries, in terms of average
age of tertiary graduation.
Indeed, the country where the problem is perhaps more evident is Italy,
which oﬀers the data used in the econometric analysis of this study. As
shown in Table 1 Italy is the Oecd country with the smallest employment
rate in the 25-29 age bracket, the highest enrollment rate in education in the
25-29 age bracket and the (second) lowest university graduation rate in the
35-44 age bracket. Since it is unlikely that cohort eﬀects may explain alone
these ﬁgures, it seems that while most Italian youths remain in educational
institutions for a longer period than youths in other comparable countries,
very few of them complete their studies and obtain a degree. This is not
because these Italian youths drop out from a legal point of view, otherwise we
would not see so many of them registered as “non-employed, in education”.
The fact is that Italian students have an abnormal tendency to extend their
permanence in a university program beyond the normal completion time, as
documented in Dornbusch at al. (2000).
Table 2 shows that while on average the mean legal duration of a univer-
sity program was 4.39 years in a representative sample of 1995 graduates, the
median eﬀective duration in the same sample was 7.00 years and the mean
was 7.41. Moreover this tendency appears to be common to all ﬁelds. Table
3 shows that out of 1,684,993 students enrolled in Italian universities during
the academic year 1999-00, 41.1% are classiﬁed as Fuori Corso, i.e. they have
been enrolled for more than the legal length of their university program. Of
the 171,086 graduates of the same year, 83.5% obtained their degree as Fuori
Corso students.
Interestingly, while throughout the world obtaining a degree within the
normal completion time is becoming the exception rather then the rule, uni-
versity tuition is often structured in a way such that students pay the same
8for each year of enrollment, whether on schedule or beyond normal comple-
tion time. In some cases–one example is Italy–students pay less when they
enroll as Fuori Corso. We are aware of only three cases that go in the op-
posite direction. In Germany a tuition ranging between 500 and 900 euro
was introduced for Fuori Corso students in diﬀerent landers between 1998
and 2005, in a period in which regular students paid no fee (see Heineck et
al, 2006). Similarly, the Finnish government passed in 1992 a reform aimed
at reducing ﬁnancial aid for students who delayed graduation (see Hakkinen
and Uusitalo, 2003). In the same spirit, the Spanish system foresees that
students pay for the credits they acquire by passing exams, but the cost of
each credit increases with the number of times the student tries to pass the
exam.
Outside of these three cases, there seems to be no evidence that academic
institutions pay any attention to the possibility that the time proﬁle of tuition
and the speed of graduation might be related. In the rest of this paper
we show, theoretically and empirically, that a link may instead exist with
possibly important eﬃciency consequences.
4 A simple theory
We consider a risk neutral individual enrolled in school. The education in-
vestment takes time and has a random outcome: graduation is not guar-
anteed and it can take one or two periods to complete the degree, that is
graduation–if it happens–can happen either in period 1 or in period 2. We
assume that there is no discounting. In each period the probability of gradu-
ating depends linearly on individual eﬀort at time t and we indicate it simply
with et. Market returns depend on whether students have graduated and on
the speed at which they have completed their studies.
At time t = 1 there is the ﬁrst attempt to graduate. Successful graduation
in the ﬁrst period leads to a market return equal to βw, where w is the outside
option and β>1. Education involves both ﬁnancial and psychological costs.
The tuition at time t = 1 is indicated with τ1 and it represents the marginal
9technological cost of providing education. Students in each period also face





where x is an ability parameter, e is eﬀort and λ is a parameter that in-
dividuals take as given.3 The marginal cost of acquiring education, xet,i s
increasing in eﬀort. There is thus a link between ability and eﬀort with bet-
ter students facing a lower marginal cost of eﬀort (a lower x means higher
ability). An obvious interpretation of x is a measure of “learning stress”. For
given eﬀort, students with higher x ﬁnd it more costly to acquire education.
A student may fail to graduate in period 1, the normal graduation time.
If this happens, she faces a reﬁnancing decision. Students who reﬁnance
education have a second attempt to graduate. The ﬁnancial cost, that is
tuition at time t = 2 is indicated with τ2, where τ2 is the technological
cost of providing education to a student who has reﬁnanced her education.
Successful graduation in the second period leads to a return equal to βδw
with 0 <δ<1 but such that βδ > 1. Unsuccessful graduation at the end of
the second period leads to a market return equal to w.
The equilibrium is described by the optimal eﬀort levels (or graduation
probabilities) e1 and e2 at time t = 1 and t = 2. The model is solved
backward, beginning with the eﬀort choice at time t =2 . 4
Our main interest is the link between tuition proﬁle and speed of grad-
uation. In this section we derive testable implications concerning the rela-
tionship between these two variables; a discussion of normative implications
is postponed to Section 7.5
3This parameter will play a role in the discussion of peer eﬀects in Section 7.
4A model with sequential schooling choices, uncertainty and drop out is described by
Altonji (1993). In that model there is no eﬀort choice and the link between eﬀort and speed
of graduation is not analyzed. Most of the emphasis of that paper is on college choice, i.e.
humanities versus math, and individuals have diﬀerent attitudes toward diﬀerent ﬁelds.
5Note that our discussion is for a ﬁxed level of income and does not consider explicitly
the individual’s ability to pay. In this interpretation the time proﬁle of tuition should
be read as a pure technological parameter, as if it were associated to the marginal cost
of providing education. Such restriction is nevertheless consistent with our empirical
speciﬁcation.
10Working backward, we ﬁrst assume that an individual reﬁnances educa-
tion at time t = 2. We compute optimal eﬀort at time t = 2, and indicate
with U2(e2,τ 2) the lifetime utility of an individual that continues education
at time t =2 . The expression is








With probability e2 the individual becomes a late graduate and enjoys a
market return equal to βδw while with the complement probability she will
accept the outside option w. The ﬁnancial cost of education (the tuition) is








Two remarks are in order
Remark 1 The time proﬁle of tuition does not aﬀect optimal eﬀort in the
second period
Remark 2 The lower the student ability, the lower the eﬀort in the second
period
The ﬁrst remark derives from the fact that
∂e∗
2
∂τ2 = 0. Tuition is a sunk
cost when the student chooses eﬀort and it aﬀects neither the psychological
cost nor the marginal return, so that it can not have an impact on the
marginal eﬀort. The second remark (which derives from
∂e∗
2
∂x < 0) suggests a
complementarity between ability and eﬀort. Other things equal, the better
the student the higher the eﬀort.
Reﬁnancing is optimal at time t = 2 if and only if U2(e∗
2,τ 2) >wwhere
e∗
2 is described by equation 1. Simple algebra (see Section 9.1 in Appendix





11a restriction on the parameter x that we assume to be satisﬁed (remember:
the lower x, the higher the student’s ability). This solves the problem in the
second period.
We now proceed to characterize optimal eﬀort in the ﬁrst period. We
indicate with U1(e1,τ 1) the life time utility for an individual that has just
enrolled










where the max operator can be eliminated by virtue of equation 2. As shown








Clearly the eﬀort chosen must be a positive number. Our key empirical
implication immediately follows
Proposition 1 Larger second period tuition increases eﬀort and the gradu-
ation probability in the ﬁrst period
Since
∂U2
∂τ2 < 0 individuals tend to work harder in the ﬁrst period to avoid
the larger tuition. This in turn implies that, for given quality x, an increase
in second period tuition increases the probability of graduation. The time
proﬁle of tuition does aﬀect the graduation probability. Tuitions is a sunk
cost within each period, but a forward looking student will take into account
the continuation cost of education and respond accordingly.
We are now in a position to summarize the eﬀect of a relative increase in




∂τ2 > 0. An increase in eﬀort and the graduation probability. This
eﬀect is our key empirical implication and motivates most of the em-
pirical analysis that follows
ii.
∂U2
∂τ2 < 0. A reduction in the utility of reﬁnancing. This implies that
there may be an increase in drop out at the end of the ﬁrst period
12iii.
∂U1
∂τ2 > 0 A decrease in utility from school participation.
The second and third results are both standard and not particularly sur-
prising. An increase in tuition reduces, other things equal, the value of
education and the student’s incentive to reﬁnance. The ﬁrst result is the
most interesting, and highlights an important link between the time proﬁle
of tuition, eﬀort choice and the speed of graduation. Speciﬁcally, it shows
that tuition paid in later periods of a program increases early eﬀort and the
graduation probability. In the model presented above the educational pro-
gram lasts one period and second period tuition refers to the tuition paid
by students who remain in the program beyond the normal completion time.
Note, however that an identical result would hold also in a model in which
the regular educational program lasts two periods and graduating beyond the
normal completion time is impossible. Also in this case, a higher tuition in
the second period would increase eﬀort in the ﬁrst one with a positive eﬀect
on the chances of graduation. The general point is that tuition paid later in
the program aﬀects early eﬀort and therefore the overall graduation speed.
This is exatly the eﬀect that we test empirically in the remaining part of the
paper.
5 The Bocconi dataset and the institutional
framework
Bocconi is a private Italian university which oﬀers undergraduate and grad-
uate degrees in economics. The administrative data we shall use refer to a
period (1992-1999) when Bocconi oﬀered a 4-years college degree, the same
length of similar economics degrees oﬀered by public universities at that time.
Since then Italian universities–as most universities in Continental Europe–
have shifted to 3-years undergraduate degrees.
Although it diﬀers in many ways from the rest of the Italian university
system, which is almost entirely public, Bocconi matches national averages
as far as the Fuori Corso problem is concerned, which is the focus of this
13study. The last row of Table 2 shows that, like in the rest of the country,
the median and the mean eﬀective time to obtain a degree are higher than
the legal duration but the diﬀerence is smaller at Bocconi. In line with the
national pattern is also the fraction of graduates who obtain a degree in more
than 4 years, which is reported in Table 3. Slightly lower than the national
average is instead the fraction of Fuori Corso students among all students
enrolled, conﬁrming that, at Bocconi, students prolong their studies beyond
the regular time as frequently as elsewhere but for a shorter period. This
will be relevant for the interpretation of our results in Section 7.
From the viewpoint of this study, however, the reason to focus on Bocconi
data is not only its similarity with the rest of the Italian university system
with respect to the Fuori Corso problem. More importantly Bocconi oﬀers
a unique quasi-experimental setting to analyze the eﬀect of tuition on the
probability of delaying degree completion. Upon enrollment in each academic
year, Bocconi students are assigned to diﬀerent tuition brackets on the basis
of their income assessed by the university administration through the income
tax declaration of the student’s household and through further inquiries. A
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) can thus be used to compare stu-
dents who, in terms of family income, are immediately above or below each
discontinuity threshold. These two groups of students pay diﬀerent tuitions
to enroll, but should otherwise be identical in terms of observable and un-
observable characteristics determining the outcome of interest, which in our
case is the decision to complete the studies in time.
For all the 12,127 students enrolled in the four years undergraduate pro-
gram at Bocconi during the period 1992-1999 we received anonymized admin-
istrative records containing information on: (a) the high school ﬁnal grade
and type; (b) family income as declared to the government for tax purposes;
(c) the theoretical tuition assigned to each student on the basis of her de-
clared family income; (d) the tuition actually paid, which may diﬀer from the
theoretical tuition for reasons to be explained below; (e) the exams passed
in each year and the related grades; (f) demographic characteristics.
Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics suggesting that Fuori Corso
14status is correlated with indicators of lower ability and educational perfor-
mance. For example, the fractions of students with top highschool grades,
who graduate cum laude, who come from the public highschool system6 and
from top highschool tracks are all higher for students in time than for stu-
dents Fuori Corso. Interestingly, also the fraction of females is higher among
those who graduate in time, while coming to Bocconi from outside Milan,
where the university is located, does not seem to matter.7 Declared family in-
come is on average higher for students in time, although this obviously does
not say much on the causal relationship between ability to pay and Fuori
Corso status, since family income may be correlated positively or negatively
with students’ ability.8
In the period covered by our data, students at Bocconi were assigned to
one of 12 tuition brackets deﬁned in terms of family income. The highest
bracket is reserved to students who accept without discussion the highest
tuition and who are therefore exempted from producing their tax form. Since
we have no income information on the students assigned to this bracket, we
drop them from the analysis. Note that these students are in any case likelyto
be located far away from any relevant discontinuity threshold. The temporal
evolution of tuition in the 11 remaining brackets is described in Figure 1.I t
should be noted that, for Italian standards, tuition at Bocconi is fairly high,
ranging, for the observed 11 brackets, between 715 and 6,101 euro per year
(in constant 2000 prices).
The students who do not accept the highest bracket are asked to produce
the tax declaration from the previous ﬁscal year, which reports their family’s
income. This is the ﬁrst of three institutional features of our setting that
makes the RDD design of this paper diﬀerent from a standard design and that
requires proper consideration in our analysis. Familiescan in principlecontrol
6With very few exceptions, private highschools in Italy are of a signiﬁcantly lower
quality, admitting those students who do not survive in the public school system.
7Bocconi is one of the very few Italian universities that attracts students from far away.
8Given the relatively high tuition at Bocconi, for Italian standards, students with poor
family backgrounds or coming from far away with higher mobility costs, typically enroll
only if they have better highschool grades, which suggest higher ability.
15their declared taxable income in order to be assigned to a lower bracket.
As a result, while in a typical RDD subjects cannot control the indicator
that determines exposure to treatment, in our case they can and this may
cause an endogenous sorting of students around a discontinuity threshold.
Although this is a possibility we ﬁnd no evidence that it actually takes place,
as shown in Figure 2 which plots the histogram of family incomes around
two representative discontinuity threshold, the second and the seventh. If
sorting were important we should ﬁnd a concentration of probability mass
immediately below each discontinuity, but this is not what we see for these
two thresholds (as well as for the others not reported to save on space).
The second institutional feature that diﬀerentiates our RDD from the
standard design relates to the fact that Bocconi reserves the right to make
its own re-assessment of the ability to pay of a family on the basis of further
inquiries. As a result of this re-assessment a student may be assigned to a
higher tuition level than the one implied by her declared taxable income.
Moreover, for a variety of reasons (e.g. merit, orphan because of “war or
assimilated reasons”, child of emigrants, etc.), students may have a right to
partial or total tuition exemptions, and may also end up paying less than
what would be implied by their taxable income.
Figure 3 shows what this means for the second and the seventh repre-
sentative thresholds that we have already examined. In each panel the low
theoretical tuition corresponding to each threshold has been normalized to
1. Consider the panel for the seventh threshold. The dark bars are the his-
togram of the tuition eﬀectively paid by students who in theory should pay
the low theoretical level 1 (i.e. they have an income lower than the cut-oﬀ
point). The tallest dark bar corresponding to 1 indicates that approximately
50% of the students who should pay the low tuition eﬀectively pay it. The
other dark bars indicate that the remaining half of the students assigned to
the low theoretical tuition pay substantially more or less than what should
theoretically happen on the basis of the fact that their income is below the
cut-oﬀ point. The light bars can be interepreted in the same way for the stu-
dents who should pay the high theoretical tuition corresponding to the seven
16threshold. Also in this case the tallest light bar indicates that most students
eﬀectively pay the high theoretical tuition to which they are assigned (be-
cause their income is above the cut-oﬀ point), but many do not comply with
the assignment. The same happens for the second threshold in the other
panel of the ﬁgure, as well as for the other thresholds not reported to save
space. Bocconi, unfortunately, refused to give us full information on the
specifc reasons of deviations from theoretical tuition for the cases in which
this happens and thus we cannot control for it. Nevertheless, our analysis
must take into account that while in the vicinity of a threshold assigned tu-
ition is binary, tuition actually paid is potentially continuous and eﬀectively
multi-valued and this means that our RDD diﬀers from the conventional “bi-
nary assignment – binary treatment” design in which counterfactual causal
analysis is typically framed.9.
The third important way in which the RDD of this paper deviates from
the standard design is a direct consequence of the second. It is evident
from Figure 3 that our experimental framework features a large amount of
non-compliance with the assignment: in other words many students pay a
tuition level that diﬀers from the one that they should pay theoretically as
a function of where their income is located with respect to the discontinuity
points. Moreover, Table 5 shows that this non-compliance is correlated with
relevant (i.e. non-ignorable) observable characteristics. In our context, in
which treatment is multivalued, this is equivalent to a fuzzy RDD, but what
is potentially more problematic is that it may imply a signiﬁcant violation
of the monotonicity assumption which, as discussed in Section 6 below, is
needed for identiﬁcation in a RDD.10 This assumption requires that, at each
threshold, students assigned to the lower theoretical tuition do not eﬀectively
pay more than if they had been assigned to the higher theoretical tuition of
the same threshold. Consider a student with a family income immediately
below a threshold. Bocconi has a stronger incentive to open her ﬁle and
re-assess her income than if the student had been located immediately above
9See, for example, Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw, 2001.
10See, Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) and Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001).
17the threshold, because in the ﬁrst case a small re-assesment would be enough
to increase the tuition obtained from this student. However, once the ﬁle is
open the re-assesment may be large and imply a large increase in tuition.
As a result, it is possible that the same student pays eﬀectively more if
assigned immediately below a threshold than if assigned immediately above,
and this would imply a violation of monotonicity. A similar reasoning holds
for the case of a student assigned immediatelyabove a threshold and therefore
having a stronger incentiveto ask for a tuition exemption than if she had been
assigned by familyincome immediatelybelow the threshold. In Section 6.4 we
will perform a formal test suggesting that monotonicity is eﬀectively violated
in our context, but we will also show that our data feature a specic case in
which this violation does not prevent the identiﬁcation and interpretation of
the causal eﬀect of interest.
We restrict the analysis to students in the fourth year of the program,
i.e. the last regular year of studies.11 This restriction leaves us with 10,216
students, whose distribution across theoretical tuition brackets and Fuori
corso status is described in Table 6. As shown in Figure 4, many variables
which are relevant for our evaluation study display a signiﬁcant time variation
in these years. While little can be said on the determinants of this time
variation, our econometric analysis willhave to control for it in an appropriate
way when pooling together observations from diﬀerent years.
Finally, note that for the students who ﬁnish in time we do not observe
a Fuori Corso tuition. So, what we can measure in the empirical part of
the paper is the eﬀect of the fourth year tuition on the probability of going
Fuori Corso. The theoretical model of Section 4 suggests that fourth year
tuition increases the speed of graduation for two reasons: ﬁrst because it
induces students to exert more eﬀort in previous years, and second because,
as long as it is a good proxy of the tuition that students would pay if they go
Fuori Corso, it captures the additional eﬀect of Fuori Corso tuition on fourth
11These students are observed between 1995 and 2002, since they ﬁrst enrolled between
1992 and 1999.
18year eﬀort.12 In the rest of the paper we test the validity of this theoretical
prediction.
6 The evidence
6.1 A Regression Discontinuity Design for our prob-
lem
Let yj be the j-th discontinuity point corresponding to the income level that
separates tuition brackets j and j + 1 in the theoretical assignment rule
adopted by Bocconi University. We focus on the identiﬁcation of causal
eﬀects for students in a neighborhood of this discontinuitypoint. Let Y be the
student’s real income and τt be the theoretical tuition that the student should
pay according to the assignment rule, with l and h being the values of τt





l ) the tuition that a student in a neighborhood of the discontinuitywould
actually pay if the theoretical tuition assigned to her were h (l). As explained




l are potentially continuous and eﬀectively multi-
valued. Finally, let Fh (Fl) be the binary Fuori Corso status of a student
under the theoretical tuition assignments h (l).
Under the continuity conditions
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(see Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw, 2001) the mean eﬀects of being as-
signed to the higher theoretical tuition bracket τt = h (instead of the lower
one τt = l) on the tuition actually paid τp and on the Fuori corso status F
12We estimate that the coeﬃcient of a regression of the tuition eﬀectively paid by a
student on the tuition paid the year before, controlling for income and year eﬀects, is 0.81
with a standard error of 0.004. Thus, tuition in a given year is a good predictor of tuition
in the following year.
13In principle, a subscript j should be attached to the values of the theoretical tuition,
but since in this sub-section we consider only one generic threshold j we omit this subscript
to simplify notation. It will instead be needed later in Section 6.4.













These are the so called Intention-to-Treat eﬀects. For the sake of keeping the
notation simple, here and below we omit time subscripts, but in our context
these equations hold only conditioning on time periods. This because, as we
explained at the end of Section 5, the composition of the pool of Bocconi
students changed over the years with respect to some observables relevant
to the outcome. It is therefore necessary to condition on the time period
to make the students just above the cut-oﬀ point comparable to those just
below it with respect to such observables.
To convert the Intention-to-Treat eﬀects into a meaningful causal eﬀect
of τp on F we rely on Angrist, Graddy and Imbens (2000). The exclusion
restriction requires that the theoretical tuition τt aﬀects the Fuori Corso
status F only through the tuition eﬀectively paid τp. This is a plausible
restriction in our context. More critical is the monotonicity condition that
we will discuss in Section 6.4, asserting that no one is induced to pay a lower
(higher) actual tuition if exogenously moved, in terms of theoretical tuition,













identiﬁes the mean eﬀect of a unit change in τp on the probability of going
Fuori Corso at Y = yj for those who are induced to pay a higher actual
tuition because their theoretical tuition increases from l to h (and viceversa).
This is a mean eﬀect in the following sense. At the individual level the mean
is taken by averaging over the causal eﬀect of τp on F speciﬁc to that student
at each value of τt in the range (l,h). Then, such individual speciﬁc mean
eﬀects are averaged over the pool of students whose actual tuition increases
with the theoretical one.
206.2 Graphical evidence
Figure 5 plots nonparametric regressions of the variables τt, τp and F on
Y respectively for students at the discontinuity thresholds 2 and 7, which
are representative of what we obtain in the other cases. The regressions are
estimated separately above and below the cut-oﬀ points to let the possible
jump at the threshold show up if it exists. Thus, these plots oﬀer a visual
image of the intention-to-treat eﬀects deﬁned in equations (6) and (7).
The tuition τp eﬀectively paid by the student is uniformly not lower than
the theoretical tuition τt on both sides of the threshold. However, while at
the cut-oﬀ point 7 the mean value of τp above the threshold is higher than
the mean value below, the reverse happens at the cut-oﬀ point 2. This again
suggests the possibility that the monotonicity condition is violated.
As for the main outcome of interest, the probability to observe F =1i s
higher above the cut-oﬀ point for discontinuity 7 but the opposite happens
at the second discontinuity. However, the mean impact of τp on F, which
is the ratio between the jump of Pr(F = 1) and the jump of τp, turns
out to be negative at both discontinuities. This implies that in both cases
the probability of going Fuori Corso changes in the opposite direction with
respect to the tuition eﬀectively paid when the threshold is crossed.
To gather evidence on the validity of the continuity conditions (4)a n d( 5)
on which our identiﬁcation strategy relies, we implementan over-identiﬁcation
test following Lee (2006). Consider the set of pre-intervention outcomes that
meet the following two conditions: they should not be aﬀected by the tuition
system of fourth-year students at Bocconi University, but they should de-
pend on the same unobservables (e.g. ability), likely to aﬀect the Fuori Corso
status F.T w opre-intervention outcomes satisfying these requirements are
family income before enrollment at Bocconi and the grade that a student
receives in her ﬁnal exam at the end of highschool. Both these variables are
observed at least three years before the fourth year at Bocconi in which our
quasi-experiment is framed. If we found that students on the two sides of
a discontinuity point diﬀer with respect to these variables, we would have
21to conclude that our identiﬁcation strategy fails since students assigned to
τt = h are presumably not comparable to student assigned to τt = l with
respect to unobservables relevant for the outcome F. Figure 6 shows that no
discontinuity of this kind emerges at the representative discontinuities 2 and
7. A formal test conﬁrming this evidence is described below in Section 6.3.
More generally, in the next Section we go beyond the visual evidence
presented so far, showing how the estimates obtained separately at each
threshold can be aggregated in a single overall estimate. In Section 6.4 we
will then assess the robustness of these estimates with respect to violations
of monotonicity.
6.3 Aggregation of the mean eﬀects at diﬀerent thresh-
olds
By aiming at a single aggregate estimate of the causal eﬀect of the tuition
eﬀectively paid on the probability of going Fuori Corso we gain precision at
the expense of some insight into how the mean eﬀect of interest varies with
Y . Following Angrist and Lavy (1999), an overall estimate can be obtained
from the equation
F = g(Y )+βτ
p + γt + ￿ (9)
where g(Y ) is a fourth order polynomial in Y and τt⊥￿ is used as an instru-
ment for τp. For the reasons explained at the end of Section 5, we include
year-speciﬁc eﬀects γt in this regression. This IV estimate of the mean ef-
fect is a weighted average of the RDD estimates at each discontinuity point,
where the weights are proportional to the local covariances cov(τp,τt|Y = yj),
j =1 ,10.
In Table 7 we report the Intention-to-Treat, the OLS and the IV results
for the analysis of the Fuori Corso outcome based on equation (9) estimated
separately at each discontinuity point. The ﬁnal row contains aggregate
results based on the entire sample. There is not enough precision to trust
the estimates obtained separately for each discontinuity point, but when we
focus on the overall estimates in the last row, the results are suﬃciently
22precise.
The overall Intention-to-Treat eﬀect of τt on τp (column 1) indicates that
each additional euro of theoretical tuition converts into .59 euro of tuition
actually paid. This because students assigned to the right of a threshold
are more likely to request tuition discounts. However, despite this dilution,
the overall Intention-to-Treat eﬀect of τt on F (column 2) suggests that
if Bocconi raised the theoretical tuition by 1,000 euro the probability of
going Fuori Corso would decrease by 3.6 percentage points, with respect to
a sample average of approximately 80%.
While the OLS regression of F on τp suggests a positive eﬀect of the
tuition eﬀectively paid on the probability of going Fuori Corso (column 3),
the IV estimate of the same eﬀect is -.061 and is statistically signiﬁcant
(column 4). This means that a 1,000 euro increase in paid tuition reduces the
probability of late graduation by 6.1 percentage points, an eﬀect that should
again be evaluated with respect to a sample average of 80% Fuori Corso
students. The large bias of the OLS estimate is due to the confounding factors
(e.g. ability) which are instead controlled for by our Regression Discontinuity
Design.
These results rest of course on the validity of the continuity conditions
(4) and (5) for which we now provide formal support following Lee (2006).
The test is implemented by running the same IV regression (9) using as a
dependent variable a battery of pre-intervention outcomes. The evidence is
reported in Table 8. The ﬁrst pre-intervention outcome that we consider is
family income before enrollment at Bocconi. This outcome allows to test not
only the validity of the continuity conditions but also the conclusion, based
on Figure 2, that even if families controlled their taxable income there would
be no sorting around thresholds (see Section 5). A negative estimate of the
IV coeﬃcient on τp in this equation (and of the corresponding ITT) using
τt as an instrument, would indicate that subjects below the cut-oﬀ points in
their fourth year have a disproportionally higher (real) family income three
years before. This would suggest the possibility that some of these subjects
are in fact richer but have manipulated their income just enough to pay
23less once they enroll at Bocconi. No such evidence emerges in the ﬁrst row
of Table 8. The intention to treat estimate in the ﬁrst column indicates
that a 1,000 euro increase in the theoretical tuition τt is associated with
an increase of 380 euro in family income before enrollment. This estimate
is small, statistically not diﬀerent from zero and its sign is opposite to the
one expected under the sorting hypothesis. Similarly insigniﬁcant is the IV
estimate in the third column. We can, therefore, exclude the existence of
sorting around the thresholds on the basis of family income.
The rest of the Table presents evidence on other pre-intervention out-
comes that should not be aﬀected by the tuition system of fourth-year stu-
dents while depending on the same unobservables (e.g. ability), likelyto aﬀect
the Fuori Corso status F. In addition to the ﬁnal highschool grade, that we
already examined in Figure 6 for discontinuities 2 and 7, here we consider
also three other pre-intervention outcomes: the type of highschool attended
by the student, her regional origin and her Grade Point Average (GPA) in
the ﬁrst year at Bocconi. Attending a highschool designed to prepare for a
university curriculum (Liceo), as opposed to one designed to prepare for di-
rect entrance in the labor market (Istituto Tecnico e professionale), is likely
to be an outcome that depends on ability without being aﬀected by tuition
at Bocconi.14 Going to Bocconi from outside Milan has signiﬁcantly higher
relocation costs and is typically correlated with a higher student’s quality in
terms of highschool and university performance. Similarly correlated with
ability is the students’ GPA in the ﬁrst year, but note that this variable is
arguably less likely to be unaﬀected by the time proﬁle of tuition at Bocconi.
As in the ﬁrst row of Table 8, also in the other rows of the same table
each coeﬃcient comes from a separate regression. For example, the left cell
of the row corresponding to the ﬁnal highschool grade indicates that a 1,000
euro increase of the theoretical tuition τt is associated with an increase of
0.19 percentage points of the grade and this estimate is not only small but
14Although the Italian highschool system is organized according to tracks that should
determine the access to college education, since 1968 all highschool graduates can access
any university in any ﬁeld, independently of the track chosen during secondary education.
24also statistically not diﬀerent from zero. This is exactly what we should ﬁnd
if our identiﬁcation strategy is correct and such conclusion is conﬁrmed in
the rest of the table. These proxies of individual ability do not diﬀer across
students assigned to diﬀerent levels of the theoretical tuition τt (see the ﬁrst
column). Moreover, no systematic diﬀerence emerges with respect to the
levels of tuition eﬀectively paid τp in the IV estimates of the third column,
although τp and pre-intervention outcomes appear to be correlated in the
OLS regressions reported in the second column. The last row of the table
presents results in which the gender of the student is used as the dependent
variable in the regression (9). Although ﬁnding the same proportion of fe-
males on both sides of the discontinuities would not support our identiﬁcation
assumption because gender is not obviously correlated with ability, it is still
the case that ﬁnding the opposite would cast doubts on such assumption. It
is therefore reassuring to ﬁnd no evidence of a threat for our identiﬁcation
strategy from this test.
Table 8 supports the validity of the continuity conditions (4) and (5)o n
which our identiﬁcation strategy is based. However, before concluding that
we have identiﬁed a negative and signiﬁcant causal eﬀect of continuation tu-
ition on the probability of late graduation, we need to address the possibility
of violations of monotonicity suggested by the institutional framework and
by the visual evidence presented so far. This is done in the next section.
6.4 Testing for monotonicity and assessing the conse-
quences of its failure
While the assumption of monotonicity is reasonable in many applications, it
cannot be safely made in our context since we have both theoretical reasons
for the occurrence of deﬁance15 and empirical evidence that it does occur at
least at some discontinuity points.
In our context, deﬁers are students who would pay a higher actual tuition
if their theoretical tuition were to decrease from τt = h to τt = l and vicev-
15See Angrist, Imbens an Rubin (2006).
25ersa. As discussed in Section 5 this may happen if a theoretical assignment to
a lower bracket (based on declared family income) induces the administration
of Bocconi to search more actively for proofs of a student’s eﬀective higher
ability to pay, or if a theoretical assignment to a higher bracket induces the
student to search more actively for ways to obtain a tuition exemption.
As already noted in Section 6.2, an indication that the problem might ex-
ist in our case is oﬀered by the fact that at the second discontinuity threshold
the mean actual tuition paid by students assigned to the lower bracket τt = l
exceeds the mean actual tuition paid by students assigned to the higher
bracket τt = h (see Figure 5). Similar evidence can be found at some other
thresholds.
A formal test for the occurrence of deﬁance has been proposed by An-





l with the strict inequality holding at least for some subjects. In
words, no one would be induced to pay a lower actual tuition if her theo-
retical tuition shifted from low to high, while at least one subject should be
induced to pay a higher tuition in this event. This condition is not directly




l of a speciﬁc student are
not simultaneously observable. However, a testable implication of the in-
equality is that at each discontinuity the tuition eﬀectively paid by those in
a right neighborhood of the cut-oﬀ point must be stochastically larger than
the tuition eﬀectively paid by those in a left neighborhood of the same cut-oﬀ
point. That is, the cumulative distribution function (cdf) for those on the
right of the cut-oﬀ point should not be above the cdf for those on the left
of it at any value of its support. In our case this implication is violated at
some cut-oﬀ points. In Figure 7 we present the estimated diﬀerence between
the cdf on the left and the corresponding cdf on the right at the second and
the seventh discontinuities (.95 conﬁdence intervals are plotted). It is evi-
dent that the stochastic dominance hypohesis is rejected at these thresholds
suggesting that deﬁance occurs at least here.16
16To control for year speciﬁc eﬀects at each discontinuity point we estimated the dif-
ference among the two cdf’s and its standard errors separately for each calendar year.
26In general, the failure of monotonicity prevents a causal interpretation of
the IV estimand. This happens because, under the continuity restrictions (4)

































with D and C being the pools of deﬁers and compliers, respectively. In words,
Λ(yj) is a weighted average of the mean eﬀects of τp on F for compliers and
deﬁers, respectively. In this expression, the weights add to one but do not









l|yj,D} is by deﬁnition negative. It is therefore in
general possible that even if the mean eﬀect for compliers has the same sign
as the mean eﬀect for deﬁers, the IV estimand Λ(yj) has the opposite sign.
In this case IV would estimate a totally uninteresting and uninformative
parameter.
To deal with this problem, in Appendix B we propose a simple model
of the occurrence of deﬁance in our context and show that it has a crucial
implication for our analysis: the weight α(yj) in equation (11) should change
with j.
On the other hand, our empirical evidence suggests that Λ(yj)i n( 8) does
not change with j in the data. This is shown in Table 9 that reports esti-
mates based on equation (9) for the entire sample, in which the coeﬃcient
β is allowed to diﬀer between three groups of discontinuity thresholds. The
ﬁrst row of the table reports the estimate for the ﬁrst three discontinuities.
The other two rows report the diﬀerence with respect to the ﬁrst row, cor-
responding, respectively, to the discontinuities 4-7 and 8-10. Inasmuch as β
estimates Λ(yj) consistently, we observe no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
Then we evaluated the weighted mean of such year-speciﬁc diﬀerences using as weights
the inverse of the sampling variances.
27in this parameter across these three groups of thresholds.17
By inspection of equation (10), for this empirical ﬁnding to be consistent
with the existence of deﬁers, suggested by theory and by the institutional
framework, it must be the case that the mean eﬀect for compliers is equal to
the mean eﬀect for deﬁers and both of them do not depend on j.
We can therefore conclude that the IV estimates of Table 7 can be inter-
preted causally as estimates of Local Average Treatment Eﬀects (LATE).18 A
1,000 euro increase in the theoretical tuition reduces the probability of late
graduation by 3.6 percentage points, while an increase of the tuition actually
paid reduces the same probability by 6.1 percentage point, in a context in
which late graduation occurs for approximately 80% of students.
6.5 Collateral eﬀects
It could be argued that in order to interpret these ﬁndings and draw policy
conclusions one should know whether a higher tuition makes it more likely
that students drop out and whether those students who try to graduate in
time do so at the expense of the quality of the learning process. Table 10
rejects both these hypothesis.
The ﬁrst row in this table presents estimates based on an equation like
(9) in which the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the student
drops out after the fourth year. The IV estimate in the last column sug-
gests that an increase of 1,000 euro in the tuition actually paid reduces the
probability of dropping out by 0.01 percentage points. This eﬀect is however
statistically insigniﬁcant: there is no evidence that students assigned to a
higher tuition or eﬀectively paying a higher tuition are more likely to drop
out.19
17 As already mentioned, the data do not contain enough information to disaggregate
the estimates for a larger number of threshold groups.
18See Imbens and Angrist (1994).
19This result diﬀers from the evidence of Dynarsky (2005) who exploits the introduction
of two large merit scholarship programs in Georgia and Arkansas to show that a reduction
of college costs increases signiﬁcantlythe probabilityof completinga degree. The diﬀerence
between our and her ﬁndings, concerning the eﬀect of college costs on dropout rates, may
be explained by the fact that the two studies are based on diﬀerent quasi-experimental
28In the second row of the table the dependent variable is the ﬁnal grad-
uation mark received by the fourth year students in our sample who had
already graduated by the time we obtained the data from Bocconi.20. This
ﬁnal graduation mark is a number between 66 (passing level) and 110 plus
honors (Laude). 21 It ranges eﬀectively between 77 and honors with a stan-
dard deviation of 7 points, and it is determined by a committee of faculty
members on the basis of the grades obtained in all the exams of the four years
and in the ﬁnal dissertation. The IV estimate in the last column suggests
that an increase of 1,000 euro in the tuition actually paid reduces the ﬁnal
mark only by 0.46 points and this eﬀect is again statistically insigniﬁcant.
We conclude from this result that if a higher tuition induces students to speed
up their coursework in order to ﬁnish earlier, this does not happen at the
expense of the quality of the learning process inasmuch as this is measured
by the ﬁnal grade.
7 Discussion and extensions
The empirical analysis has established that an increase in tuition towards
the end of the program decreases the probability of late graduation with-
out inducing more dropouts and without reducing the quality of students’
performance, at least as measured by the ﬁnal graduation mark. In other
words, students who pay more just because they are exogenously assigned to
a higher theoretical tuition, seem to exert more eﬀort in order to graduate
sooner but do not seem to learn less as a consequence of this acceleration of
the learning process.
The size of the eﬀect we have estimated – a mere 1,000 euro increase in
tuition actually paid reduces the probability of late graduation by 6.1 per-
centage points, in a context in which late graduation occurs for approximately
situations and identiﬁcation assumptions. In particular, her study focuses on tuition
diﬀerences based on merit (a minimum GPA in highschool and in college), while in our
case tuition diﬀerences are independent of merit.
20 1010 students had not graduated yet by 2004.
21 We consider honors as an additional point.
2980% of students – may look at ﬁrst puzzling. By postponing graduation a
student delays the moment she joins the labor market. This has an immedi-
ate direct cost in terms of foregone earnings during the additional time spent
in school and also an indirect long term (signalling) cost in terms of wages
and time to ﬁnd the ﬁrst job after graduation.22 We have no estimate of the
indirect cost for Bocconi students, but the direct cost is likely to be large.
One year after graduation Bocconi students earn on average 25,000 euro (at
2001 prices) and most of them ﬁnd a job in few months.23 Not surprisingly,
as reported in Table 2, the eﬀective time to degree at Bocconi, albeit longer
than the legal time to degree, is signiﬁcantly shorter than in the rest of the
Italian university system. In comparison with these ﬁgures, 1,000 euro of
additional tuition may look like a very small cost. What we have estimated,
however is a marginal eﬀect. The expected foregone income from delaying
graduation by one year determines the speed at which students graduate
given the existing tuition proﬁle. What we ﬁnd is that 1,000 euro make a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the margin, once the eﬀect of the expected foregone
income is already taken into account.
One thousand euro could still look too small an amount to produce such
a large shift in the incentive to graduate in time. A possible additional
justiﬁcation is that the “value” of a given sum of money depends on how
the students earns it. One thousand euro earned on a job could indeed be
a relatively small sum – compared with the eﬀect it has on the incentive to
speed up graduation – but for most students the money to ﬁnance education
comes eﬀectively from their parents. An interpretation of our results is then
22Using as instruments “quarter of birth” and “distance from nearest college at entry
in junior highschool”, Brodaty et al. (2006) estimate for France that a year of delay
with respect to average completion time causes a signiﬁcant 3% decrease of the wage and
a signiﬁcant 15% decrease of the probability of employment in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after
graduation.
23Ichino and Filippin (2005) compare data on a sample of Bocconi graduates with similar
data on graduates from the State University of Milan studied by Checchi (2002). Their
most conservative estimate suggests that in 2001 Bocconi graduates of 1997 earned at least
1.5 times more than State University graduates of the same year. And 92% of Bocconi
graduates had found a job within one year while the same happened for only 46% of the
gratuates at the other institution.
30that the psycological cost of asking one’s parents, when falling behind school
work, can be quite large.
Our ﬁnding – that the speed at which students decide to learn is aﬀected
by the tuition they pay – does not necessarily mean that it is socially optimal
to adopt an upward sloping tuition proﬁle and to increase continuation tu-
ition. We do not know much about the optimal length of the learning period
for given amount of notions to be learned – this is in fact an issue rarely
explored in the literature.24 Each student could choose the speed that she
considers optimal for herself, and diﬀerent individual characteristics (includ-
ing diﬀerent preferences for work and leisure) could result in quite diﬀerent
“optimal” learning speeds. To make a normative argument we need to point
to reasons why individual decisions might be sub-optimal. We see at least
three reasons why this might happen.
The most obvious one is that students, even in some private universities,
are often subsidized. If students (or their families) fail to pay the marginal
technological cost of their education they will not internalize the cost to
society of keeping them one more year in school and will make decisions that
are socially sub-optimal. Using the tuition proﬁle to aﬀect their incentives
can then improve society’s welfare.25
Another example is suggested by the evidence of “peer eﬀects” in educa-
tion. Peer eﬀects in school are at work whenever there is a link between the
individual cost of exercising eﬀort and the average eﬀort elicited by the rest
of the class. There is a large and growing literature on peer eﬀects. As al-
ready mentioned in the Introduction, the experiment conducted in Kenia and
discussed in Kremer et al. (2005)–where girls who scored well on academic ex-
ams were oﬀered cash awards and an exemption from school fees–shows that
24A related issue, also rarely explored, is the choice between a system, such as in un-
dergraduate U.K. courses, in which almost all students ﬁnish in time (because it is fairly
easy to get a passing grade) and quality is signalled by grades, and the alternative, more
common in continental Europe, in which passing grades are harder to get, thus resulting
in delayed graduation.
25The optimaltime proﬁle of tuition has been recently analysed by Gary-Bobo and Tran-
noy (2004) in a model in which both students and universities face imperfect information
on individuals’ ability.
31ﬁnancial incentives to students’ performance can have positive externalities:
boys, who were ineligible for the award, also experienced an improvement in
exam scores, and the same happened for girls with low pretest scores who
were very unlikely to win. Evidence of peer eﬀects is also reported by Ding
and Lehrer (2005) in the context of China and by Sacerdote (2001) for the
U.S. The presence of peer eﬀects oﬀers another reason why it may be eﬃcient
to use the time proﬁle of tutition to modify students’ incentives.26
Externalities, however, can also be negative. By postponing graduation
students can produce congestion, in the classroom, the libraries, etc. This
can negatively aﬀect the learning process of their colleagues. Although our
empirical work is mute on these normative issues, they each suggest relevant
arguments why using the time proﬁle of tuition to change the speed at which
a student learns could be optimal.
Finally an upward sloping tuition proﬁle is likely to aﬀect the decision to
enroll in a university. If such a proﬁle were implemented keeping constant
early tuition, fewer people would enter. Conversely, if the early tuition were
reduced, keeping the expected total cost of enrollment constant, the eﬀect
on entry would be diﬃcult to predict. This because it would depend on the
students’ assessment of their own ability and on the odds of graduation for
26The model presented in Section 4 can easily be extended to study peer eﬀects. Assume
there is a continuum of identical individuals and that the psychological cost of education
depends not only on an individual choice of eﬀort, but also on the average eﬀort exercised
by the class. Let λ, the parameter in the cost of education that each individual takes as
given be λ = λ0 − λ1¯ e where ¯ e is the average eﬀort of the class. The cost function now
implies a positive externality between the eﬀort decision of each individual and the eﬀort
of other students. Studying requires less fatigue when other people also work hard: a
peer externality. Since each individual takes as given the average eﬀort, the decentralized
equilibrium is identical to the model solved in the section 4. A central planner that
maximizes average eﬀort would however internalize the peer externality. Let ˜ e2 be the
choice of eﬀort by the central planner that takes into account the peer externality. It is




2 . In other words, eﬀort is suboptimal in the
decentralized equilibrium. The presence of peer eﬀects naturally calls for an increase in
tuition in the second period: As we established in Section 4, ﬁrst-period tuition can not
increase eﬀort since ﬁrst-period tuition is sunk and does not enter in the determination of
eﬀort, either in the ﬁrst or in the second period. Conversely, an increase in second period
tuition increases eﬀort in the ﬁrst period. It is easy to show that there exists a time proﬁle
of tuition that implements the eﬃcient outcome. Setting second period tuition to τ2+ λ1˜ e2
x
leads to optimal eﬀort in the second period.
32given ability. In any event, we leave the discussion of these issues to future
research.
8 Conclusions
This paper questions the way in which university tuition is typically struc-
tured as a function of the year of enrollment of a student. The claim is that
if tuition were raised towards the end of the program, keeping constant the
total cost of education, the probability of late graduation would be reduced.
This result could be of interest for those universities throughout the world
who are concerned by the fact that their students typically graduate beyond
the normal completion time–a tendency that appears to have become more
pronounced recently.
We have ﬁrst shown in a simple model of human capital accumulation
that there exists a negative causal eﬀect of the size of continuation tuition on
the probability of late graduation. Next we have exploited data from Boc-
coni University–where students are assigned to one of 12 tuition levels on the
basis of their declared family income–to implement a Regression Discontinu-
ity Design (RDD) which allows us to compare students with similar family
income immediately above or below each discontinuity threshold. We show
that these two groups of students pay diﬀerent tuitions, but are otherwise
identical in terms of observable characteristics determining the probability
of late graduation. Using this source of identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect of
a tuition increase, we ﬁnd that if students in the last regular year of the pro-
gram had to pay 1,000 more euro, their probability of late completion would
decrease by 6.1 percentage points. We also show that such a tuition increase
does not induce more students to drop out and its eﬀect on the speed of de-
gree completion does not occur at the expense of the quality of the learning
process inasmuch as this is measured by grades.
We have also discussed why it might be optimal to use the time proﬁle of
tuition to change student’s incentives inducing them to speed up their studies
and graduate in time. We have argued that when students are subsidized,
33when peer eﬀects are important or when congestion externalities are relevant,
eﬃciency considerations suggest that tuition towards the end of the program
and continuation tuition should be raised relative to the marginal cost of
providing education. More theoretical research and diﬀerent data would be
needed to explore the robustness of these policy conclusions.
9 APPENDIX A
9.1 Optimal Reﬁnancing at t =2













2 is described by equation 1






− τ2 − λ + w>w (12)




a condition that we assume to be satisﬁed
9.2 Optimal Eﬀort at t=1
Let’s indicate with U1(e1,x,τ 1) the life time utility for an individual at time t =1
that has decided to enroll. Its expression reads
U1(e1,x,τ 1)=e1βw+( 1− e1)Max[U2(e
∗





which by virtue of equation 12 can be written as
U1(e1,x,τ 1)=e1βw+( 1− e1)U2(e
∗













Let Yp be the permanent income of the student and let it diﬀer from Y because of
a transitory shock. The theoretical tuition is assigned on the basis of Y according
to the function τt(Y ), but the administration can acquire collateral information
on the student’s permanent income on the basis of which it can decide to move
the student’s tuition to τp = τt(Yp). We assume that the administration changes
the student’s tuition if and only if the gain for the administration is large enough,
i.e. if τt(Yp) − τt(Y ) >cwith c a positive scalar.
As a result, the link between the tuition actually paid by a student whose
current income is in a neighbourhood of the j-th cut-oﬀ point, its current income




t(Yp) >c+ lj +( hj − lj)Z. (13)
otherwise she pays τp = τt(Y ), where Z = I(Y ≥ yj).
We can now distinguish between diﬀerent relevant cases. The ﬁrst one is the
case in which τt(Yp) >c+hj. This is the case in which the administration believes
that the student has a high permanent income and raises her actual tuition to
τt(Yp) no matter for the theoretical assignment Z and therefore independently
of the side of the discontinuity threshold to which the students is assigned by
transitory income. This is a case in which tuition actually paid by the student
would be the same on the two sides of the cut-oﬀ point.
A second case is the one in which τt(Yp) <c+ lj, meaning that the adminis-
tration does not modify the result of the theoretical assignment Z. This is a case
in which perfect compliance occurs.
The third and intermediate case, in which c + lj <τ t(Yp) <c+ hj, is the one
that can generate deﬁance. In this case the administration raises the tuition of the
student to τt(Yp) only if transitory income assigns the student to the lower tuition
bracket (i.e. if Z = 0). If instead transitory income assigns the student above the
threshold (i.e. if Z = 1), Bocconi is willing to leave the tuition unchanged. As a
consequence, deﬁance occurs if hj <τ t(Yp) <c+ hj, because in this case if Z =1
Bocconi leaves tuition at hj, while if Z = 0 Bocconi raises tuition above hj.O n
35the contrary, compliance prevails if c + lj <τ t(Yp) <h j
27, because in this case
Bocconi leaves tuition at hj if Z = 1, while if Z = 0 tuition is raised above lj but
not above hj.
A similar line of reasoning, applies to the behaviour of the student who has
to decide whether to ask for exemption from tuition or not. Applying for an
exemption is worthwhile only if the gain is suﬃciently large to overcome the cost
of the application, that is if τt(Y ) − τt(Yp) >bwith b a positive constant.
An obvious implication of this model is that in general the weight α(yj)i n
(11) depends on j. This because the distribution of Yp|yj and of τt(Yp)|yj as well
as the theoretical tuitions hj and lj, which are relevant to deﬁne the domains of
integration over which the expected values in (11) are evaluated, depend on j.
27 Provided that c+lj <h j. To simplify the discussion, we maintain that this condition
is satisﬁed in what follows.
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40Table 1: Employment, educational enrollment and educational attainment
of Italian youth older than 25
25-29 years old: 35-44 years old:
Employed In education Male graduates Female graduates
Italy 61.1 14.7 11.0 11.0
Finland 61.1 10.7 32.0 42.0
Greece 68.7 6.4 24.0 19.0
Spain 69.7 10.4 25.0 25.0
Germany 74.9 7 30.0 21.0
France 76.3 5.4 21.0 24.0
Australia 78.4 4.5 27.0 32.0
Canada 78.6 5.6 39.0 46.0
Norway 78.7 11 28.0 30.0
Sweden 80.1 13 31.0 35.0
United Kingdom 80.3 3.6 28.0 26.0
Belgium 80.6 3.9 28.0 31.0
Austria 80.7 6.6 19.0 14.0
Denmark 80.8 11.5 24.0 32.0
United States 81.2 2.9 37.0 38.0
Portugal 83.9 4.8 7.0 11.0
Switzerland 85.1 5.1 37.0 21.0
Ireland 85.4 8.9 37.0 36.0
Netherlands 85.9 2.2 27.0 22.0
Country Average 77.4 7.3 26.9 27.2
Source: OECD Education at a Glance
41Table 2: Legal and eﬀective duration of university programs in Italy
Mean Median Mean
legal duration eﬀective duration eﬀective duration
Sciences 4.01 6.0 6.94
Chemistry and Pharmacy 4.66 6.0 6.95
Geo-biology 4.17 7.0 7.63
Medical school 5.77 7.0 8.28
Engineering 4.99 7.0 7.73
Architecture 4.99 8.0 8.79
Agrarian sciences 4.83 7.0 8.21
Economics and statistics 4.04 6.0 6.74
Political sciences 4.02 6.0 7.23
Law 4.02 6.0 7.04
Arts 4.02 7.0 7.61
Literature 4.02 7.0 7.38
Teaching 4.01 7.0 8.55
Psychology 4.92 6.0 6.71
Total 4.39 7.0 7.41
Bocconi University 4.00 5.5 5.00
Source: Representative sample of graduates in 1995 surveyed in 1998 - Standard sample
ﬁle “Indagine sull’inseriemento professionale dei laureati dell’anno 1995” , ISTAT. Our
sample for statistics concerning Bocconi.
42Table 3: Fraction of Fuori Corso students in Italy
All Italy Economics in Italy Bocconi University
Enrolled in year 99-00 1684993 237893 8298
%o fFuori corso 41.1 43.6 28.9
Graduates in year 99-00 171806 28106 1182
%o fFuori corso 83.5 89.9 81.2
Source: Italian Ministry of Education and our sample for statistics concerning Bocconi..
43Table 4: Descriptive statistics by fuori corso status
Conditional on being Of the total
in time fuori corso
% of the 12127 enrolled from 1992 to 1999 who:
are females 44.62 39.57 40.92
are from the Milan area 40.58 40.84 40.77
graduated from highschool with top grades 28.83 22.01 23.83
attended top highschool tracks 70.40 65.98 67.16
graduated cum laude from Bocconi 57.76 23.67 32.79
have family income (in euro) equal to 41872 38637 39502
Total 26.74 73.26 100.00
Source: Statistics for all the students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
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Source: Statistics for all the students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
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7Table 5: Characteristics of 4th year students according to whether their actual tuition is equal to, larger than or
smaller than the theoretical one
For given theoretical tuition, fraction paying:
less same more
Females 44.02 40.87 42.22
From Milan area 27.39 44.69 38.50
With top highschool grade 39.34 25.03 21.76
From top highschool tracks 56.99 71.08 67.06
Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999. The sample size is 10,216.
4
8Table 6: 4th year students by theoretical tuition bracket and Fuori Corso status
Tuition bracket “in time” Fuori Corso All students
n.obs. % n.obs. % n.obs %
1 167 14.67 971 85.33 1,138 100.00
2 79 16.09 412 83.91 491 100.00
3 63 14.58 369 85.42 432 100.00
4 117 17.84 539 82.16 656 100.00
5 86 14.60 503 85.40 589 100.00
6 174 18.20 782 81.80 956 100.00
7 182 18.69 792 81.31 974 100.00
8 356 21.65 1,288 78.35 1,644 100.00
9 303 25.83 870 74.17 1,173 100.00
10 194 24.56 596 75.44 790 100.00
11 342 24.91 1,031 75.09 1,373 100.00
Total 2,063 20.19 8,153 79.81 10,216 100.00
Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
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Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
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Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
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5
2Table 7: Regression discontinuity estimates of the eﬀect of tuition on the probability of late graduation (Fuori corso)
Method OLS-ITT OLS-ITT OLS IV-LATE N. of obs.
Outcome Paid Tuition Fuori Corso Fuori Corso Fuori Corso
Treatment Paid Tuition Paid Tuition
Instrument Theoretical Tuition Theoretical Tuition Theoretical Tuition
Discontinuity 1 -2.5 .42 -.0086 -.17 1376
s.e. (2.2) (.54) (.007) (.26)
Discontinuity 2 -2.4 .21 .0047 -.088 463
s.e. (1.5) (.37) (.011) (.16)
Discontinuity 3 .64 -.13 -.012 -.2 563
s.e. (1.2) (.31) (.013) (.59)
Discontinuity 4 .51 .17 -.0058 .33 636
s.e. (.64) (.17) (.01) (.54)
Discontinuity 5 -.4 -.2 .017 .5 742
s.e. (.54) (.14) (.01) (.77)
Discontinuity 6 .52 -.078 .0063 -.15 961
s.e. (.41) (.11) (.01) (.25)
Discontinuity 7 .11 -.06 .011 -.56 1331
s.e. (.25) (.10) (.01) (1.6)
Discontinuity 8 .38 -.07 .017 -.19 1453
s.e. (.14) (.076) (.014) (.21)
Discontinuity 9 .24 -.022 .027 -.095 957
s.e. (.12) (.09) (.02) (.38)
Discontinuity 10 .57 .11 .046 .2 1734
s.e. (.12) (.09) (.022) (.17)
All .59 -.036 .0021 -.061 10216
s.e. (.05) (.018) (.004) (.031)
Note: Each coeﬃcient (and related robust standard error in parenthesis) is an estimate of β obtained from separate regressions of the
form:
W = g(Y ) + βτK + γt + ￿
where W is the tuition actually paid τp in column 1 and the Fuori Corso status F in the other columns; τk is the theoretical tuition
τt in column 1 and 2, and the tuition actually paid τp in column 3 and 4. Estimates in columns 1,2 and 3 are obtained with OLS; in
column 4 with IV using τt as an instrument for τp. γt are time dummies.
Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
5
3Table 8: Tests for the presence of sorting and for the validity of the continuity conditions
Method OLS-ITT OLS IV-LATE N. of obs.
Treatment Paid Tuition Paid Tuition
Instrument Theoretical Tuition Theoretical Tuition
Income before Bocconi .38 .75 .66 9800
( .46) ( .11) (.81)
Highschool grade .0019 -.013 .0032 10216
( .0048) ( .00096) (.0082)
Highschool type -.032 .029 -.055 10216
( .02) ( .0042) ( .034)
Family of origin outside Milan -.025 -.017 -.042 10216
( .022) ( .0041) ( .038)
GPA in ﬁrst year at Bocconi -.0024 -.0075 -.0041 10153
( .0033) ( .00066) ( .0057)
Female .029 -.0068 .05 10216
( .022) ( .0044) ( .038)
Note: Each coeﬃcient (and related robust standard error in parenthesis) is an estimate of β obtained from separate regressions of the
form:
S = g(Y ) + βτ
K + γt + ￿
where S is the pre-intervention outcome indicated in the corresponding row of the table; τk is the theoretical tuition τt in column 1 and
the tuition actually paid τp in column 2 and 3. Estimates in columns 1 and 2 are obtained with OLS; in column 3 with IV using τt as
an instrument for τp. γt are time dummies.
Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
5
4Figure 7: A test of monotonicity: CDF crossing
For each discontinuity the ﬁgure plots the estimated diﬀerence between the cdf of the tuition actually paid by students in a left
neighbourhood of the cut-oﬀ point and the corresponding cdf paid by students in a right neighbourhood. 0.95 conﬁdence intervals are
plotted as well. The left (right) neighbourhood is deﬁned selecting students whose family income is below (above) the cut-oﬀ point by
no more than 500 euro.
Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
5
5Table 9: Test for the equality of the IV estimand Λ(yj) at diﬀerent discontinuity thresholds
Method OLS-ITT OLS IV-LATE
Outcome Fuori Corso Fuori Corso Fuori Corso
Treatment Theoretical Tuition Paid Tuition Paid Tuition
Instrument Theoretical Tuition
IV estimand Λ(yj) -0.065 -0.008 -0.090
at the discontinuities (0.027) (0.005) (0.036)
1 2 and 3
Deviation of the 0.019 0.016 0.015
IV estimand Λ(yj) (0.016) (0.006) (0.013)
at the discontinuities
4, 5, 6 and 7
Deviation of the 0.013 0.017 0.014
IV estimand Λ(yj) (0.018) (0.007) (0.015)
at the discontinuities
8, 9 and 10
Note: The rows of the table report respectively the coeﬃcients β1,3 β4,7 and β8,10 of the regression
F = g(Y ) + β1,3τKD1,3 + β4,7τKD4,7 + β8,10τKD8,10 + γt + ￿
where F is the Fuori Corso status; the dummies Di,j denote the discontinuity thresholds from i to j; τk is the theoretical tuition τt in
column 1, and the tuition actually paid τp in column 2 and 3. Estimates in columns 1 and 2 are obtained with OLS; in column 3 with
IV using τt as an instrument for τp. γt are time dummies.
Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999.
5
6Table 10: Eﬀect of tuition on on dropout rates and ﬁnal graduation marks
Method OLS-ITT OLS IV-LATE N. of obs.
Treatment Paid Tuition Paid Tuition
Instrument Theoretical Tuition Theoretical Tuition
Drop-out -.006 -.004 -.010 10212
(.008) (.002) (.013)
Final graduation mark -.29 -.83 -.46 9206
(min= 66; max= 110) (.33) (.06) (.52)
Note: Each coeﬃcient (and related robust standard error in parenthesis) is an estimate of β obtained from separate regressions of the
form:
W = g(Y ) + βτ
K + γt + ￿
where W is a dummy for dropping out in top panel and the ﬁnal graduation mark ranging between 66 and 110 (111 in case of honors)
with a standard deviation of 7 points in the bottom panel; τk is the theoretical tuition τt in column 1, and the tuition actually paid τp
in column 2 and 3. Estimates in columns 1 and 2 are obtained with OLS; in column 3 with IV using τt as an instrument for τp. γt are
time dummies.
Source: Statistics for the 4th year students who enrolled in the ﬁrst year at Bocconi between 1992 and 1999. The smaller sample size in
the bottom panel originates from the fact that 1010 studens had not graduated yet by 2004, when we received the data from Bocconi.
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